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NOTE
MATERIAL PARTICIPATION AND THE
VALUATION OF FARM LAND FOR ESTATE TAX
PURPOSES UNDER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
There is one difference between a tax collector and a taxider-
mist-the taxidermist leaves the hide.
-Mortimer Caplan, former
Director Bureau of Internal
Revenue'
INTRODUCTION
The estate tax provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
allow for special use valuation of farmland for inheritance tax
purposes.2 The election of the special use valuation, which al-
lows valuation of farmland as farmland, could prove to be a
IME, Feb. 1, 1963, at 13.
2 I.R.C. § 2032A. The Kentucky legislature recently enacted similar legislation.
The legislature amended the state's inheritance tax law so as to accord special farm-
use valuation to farms passing in the estate of a decedent dying on or after July 1, 1978.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 140.152, .300-.360 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. The
Kentucky provisions closely parallel the federal statute. Compare KRS § 140.300-.360
(Supp. 1978) with I.R.C. § 2032A. Land that has been in agricultural or horticultural
use for the five years prior to decedent's death and which passes to qualified heirs may
be assessed at its special, farm-use value. If, within five years after decedent's death,
the land is sold to non-qualified heirs or taken out of agricultural or horticultural
production, recapture provisions are triggered. If the land has been specifically valued
for ad valorem tax purposes, then that special value is used for inheritance tax pur-
poses; otherwise, the farm-use value of the land is to be determined according to the
provisions of KRS § 132.010(9).
There are three major differences between the Kentucky provisions and I.R.C. §
2032A. First, the class of qualified people to whom the land may pass is defined more
narrowly in Kentucky. While I.R.C. § 2032A defines qualified heirs as the lineal des-
cendants of the decedent's grandparents and those descendants' spouses, the Ken-
tucky provision defines a qualified person to be the decedent's spouse, children, or
children's spouses. Second, the land must have been used for agricultural or horticul-
tural purposes for five years prior to the death of the owner and, to avoid recapture,
must be used for such purposes for only five years after the owner's death. Unlike the
federal provision, the five years must be consecutive and unbroken. Finally, the Ken-
tucky provision does not require material participation by either the decedent or the
qualified person during any period of ownership. The Kentucky provision is not de-
signed strictly to benefit only the family farm; it applies to any land used for agricul-
tural or horticultural purposes.
MATERIAL PARTICIPATION
great benefit to the family farm. Although there are numerous
requirements, one requirement is of particular importance for
estate planning purposes and for planning the use of the land
by the heir or devisee. There must be material participation in
the operation of the farm both by the decedent or a member of
his family during the years before the decedent's death and by
a member of his family in the years after the decedent's death.
Because there must be material participation in at least five of
the eight years prior to decedent's death, the farmer who wishes
to pass the family operation to the next generation, or perhaps
to grandchildren, must be aware of the requirement in the early
stages of estate planning. It is not possible to create prior mate-
rial participation after death nor to forecast the date of death;
therefore one may not defer until that nebulous tomorrow the
planning for material participation that the estate tax laws
require be done today.
This note will examine the material participation require-
ment of section 2032A. The examination will encompass the
legislative history of the provision, an overview of section
2032A, a definition of material participation, an evaluation of
the material participation requirement, and estate planning
ramifications.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The massive Tax Reform Act of 19763 made important
changes in federal estate taxation. Congressman Al Ullman,
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, charac-
terized the estate tax package as "one of the most important
aspects of this whole legislation."4 Some provisions of the pack-
age engendered lively debate, 5 but on one principle most con-
gressmen agreed-tax relief was due the family farmer.6 One
Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
122 CONG. REc. H10,263 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Ullman).
See the debates in the House on the carryover basis provision, 122 CONG. REc.
H10,264-75 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976), and in the Senate on the Nelson-Packwood
amendment proposing a special tax credit for family farms and small businesses, 122
CONG. REc. S13,590-608 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976).
See, e.g., the remarks of various participants, especially Senators Kennedy and
Nelson and Representatives Conable and Keys. 122 CONG. Rac. S13,598-605 (daily ed.
Aug. 5, 1976); Id. at H10,264-71 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976); and HousE Com. ON WAYS
AND MZAs, ESTATE mAD Girr TAX REFORM ACr OF 1976, H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong.,
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manifestation of this general sentiment is the provision for spe-
cial valuation of farm realty based on its actual use7 rather than
its highest and best use.8
A. The Problem Addressed by Congress
During the post-World War II years, the number of farms
in the United States decreased by over two million.' The prog-
nosis is that 200,000 to 400,000 farms will be lost during the
2d Sess. 188 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3438
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1380, with page citation to the U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS].
While the legislators could agree with the principle of relief for the farmer, they
could not always agree on the form relief should take, as evidenced by their debate
over the Nelson-Packwood amendment. 122 CONG. REc. S13,590-608 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1976).
1 The valuations must be based on use of the real property for farming
purposes . . . within the locality but not necessarily the specific activity
carried on by the decedent or family member. Thus if the land could be used
for a more profitable agricultural activity than the one to which the land is
actually being used and other comparable land is being so used, the special
use value will apparently be based on the more profitable agricultural activ-
ity.
M.L. Fellows, Supplement on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 116, in F. COLSON & D.
KAHN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as COLSON & KAHN Supplement].
COLSON & KAHN Supplement offers a thorough, thoughtful, and precise treatment
of I.R.C. § 2032A.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2003, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976); I.R.C.
§ 2032A. As the title, "Valuation for Purposes of the Federal Estate Tax of Certain
Real Property Devoted to Farming or Closely Held Businesses," suggests, Congress
also sought to benefit the small business.
It should be recognized also that farm property owned in partnership, by a close
corporation, or by a beneficial owner of a trust might also qualify for special use
valuation. I.R.C. § 2032A(g) provides that the Secretary of the Treasury "shall pre-
scribe regulations setting forth the application of this section . . . in the case of an
interest in a partnership, corporation, or trust." The proposed regulations do give
attention to such indirect ownership situations and make it clear that both the dece-
dent and qualified heir must take an active role in the farm operation in order to
qualify. 43 Fed. Reg. 31,040-41 (1978) (Proposed Tress. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(b), (e)).
1 122 CONG. REc. H10,273 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. McCollister).
During the post-World War 11 period, the number of farms in Kentucky was
reduced from 238,501 in 1945 to 102,053 in 1974, a loss of 136,448 farms. Although the
average farm size increased from 83 acres to 141 acres during the same period, more
than five million acres were removed from agricultural production. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1974 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, Vol. I, pt. 17, KENTUCKY:
STATE AND COUNTY DATA, Table 1, at I-1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1974 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE].
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next twenty years.'0 Congress believed that the federal estate
tax contributed to the decline of family farms in two ways.
First, the estate tax exemption levels had not been adjusted to
account for the inflation in land values." The farmer who
bought a modest farm of 300 acres at $100 per acre in 1942 had,
at that time, an estate within the $60,000 basic exemption.'
2
During the ensuing years inflation increased the value of his
farm, causing his estate to exceed the exemption levels'3 and
be subject to federal estate tax. 4 However, inflation did not
add to the farmer's real wealth. The estate tax had not been
intended to tax such modest estates. As one legislator put it,
the estate tax burden was now falling on the "farmer with an
old Chevy."' 5
Second, the estate tax laws required the estate to be val-
ued at its fair market value." The actual value of land is a
" 122 CONG. REc. S13,606 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen); 122
CONG. REc. H10,272 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Bedell).
"1 122 CONG. REc. H10,272 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks ofRep. Broomfield).
See also id. at H10,273 (remarks of Rep. Sebelius); id. at S13,606 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1976) (remarks of Sen. Dole); H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 6, at 3359.
,2 I.R.C. § 2052 (repealed 1976).
23 Representative John McCollister noted that the average value of farmland in
Nebraska rose from $24 per acre in 1942 to $289 per acre in 1975. 122 CoNG. REC.
H10,273 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976).
In Kentucky, the average per acre value of a farm (including land and buildings)
in 1945 was $52 per acre. By 1974, the per acre value had risen to $427. Of the 102,053
Kentucky farms.in 1974, 22,315 were valued at more than $70,000. In 1969, only 11,489
farms had a value in excess of $70,000. The number of farms potentially subject to the
estate tax had virtually doubled in five years. 1974 CENSUS OF AGmcuLTuRE, supra note
9, at Table 1, I-1.
" 122 CONG. REc. H10,272 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Broomfield).
See also id. at H10,273 (remarks of Rep. Sebelius); id. at S13,606 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1976)(remarks of Sen. Dole); H. REp. No. 1380, supra note 6, at 3359.
11 Senator Nelson said:
If I may paraphrase the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee
in introducing his original estate gift tax reform proposal, MR. ULLMAN said
the estate tax laws which were aimed at the great fortunes of this country
are now hitting the average farmer with an old Chevy. I think the Congress
can do better than that in designing an equitable estate tax law.
122 CONG. REC. S13,593 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Nelson) (footnote
omitted). See also id. at S13,606 (remarks of Sen. Bentsen).
In Kentucky, the average value per farm (land and buildings) had risen from
$4,259 in 1945 to $60,344 in 1974; thus by 1974 the average farm exceeded the exemp-
tion level. 1974 CENsus OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 9, Table 1, at -1..
26 See, e.g., 122 CONG. REc. S13,595-96 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
RibicofO; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367.
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correlative of its actual use. Yet the fair market value of land
is a correlative of the land's potential use. 7 Whenever farmland
can be put to a nonfarm use that will produce a higher yield,
the fair market value of the land will exceed its actual value
as farm land.
However, economic factors alone do not determine use. A
farmer may well make his decision to use his land for farming
based on other criteria such as his dedication to farming or his
love of the land, criteria which may be eminently sensible. But
a farmer's decision to continue farming does not negate the
paper value, the fair market value, that attaches to his land;
in the fair market scheme of things there is someone willing and
able to pay more for the land if it has a potential use more
profitable than farming.'
8
When a farmer dies and devises his land, the paper value
becomes significant. If, prior to 1976, inflation alone had not
already pushed the value of his land above the basic exemption
level, the fair market value of the land might well have done
SO.9 This put the family farm in extreme circumstances. The
nonliquid nature"0 of the capital investment in land often left
the devisees in the unenviable position of either having to sell
part of the farm or to borrow to pay the tax.2' The late Senator
" 122 CONG. REc. S13,606 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
" This difference btween actual use value and fair market value is most fre-
quently characteristic of farmland near expanding urban areas. Id. For example, the
average value per acre of farmland in Fayette County, in which the city of Lexington
is located, is $1,297; in neighboring Jessamine County the average value per acre is
$780. But in rural Carlisle and Graves Counties the average value per acre is $375 and
$406, respectively. All figures include the value of land and buildings in the per acre
value. 1974 CENsus OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 9, Table 1, at H-1.
" The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation noted that "the percentage of
decedents whose estates have been subjected to the Federal estate tax has increased
from 1 percent to 8 percent." JOINT Comm. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D Sass., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 at 12 (Comm. Print 1976).
2 See, e.g., 122 CONG. Rxc. S13,750 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Mathias); id. at H10,265 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Conable); id. at
S13,595 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Packwood).
21 Senator Robert Mathias stated the problem as follows:
The following entirely realistic example illustrates the impact of the
estate tax on farmland, woodland, open space, and historical property:
Farmer Jones, a widower, dies, leaving his estate to his two sons, who wish
to continue living on and farming the land. Farmer Jones' estate consists of
his farm-300 acres-and farm equipment and other personal property val-
ued at $50,000. Used as a farm, the land is worth $500 an acre. If the Federal
[Vol. 66
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Hubert Humphrey recounted the story of a constituent from
Fisher, Minnesota:
Largely due to the increase in crop prices and inflation of land
and machinery values, my net worth jumped to $480,000 on
January 1, 1974 and to $709,000 on January 1, 1975.
The estate tax at this point in time is estimated at $115,000
if I die first and over $280,000 if my wife dies before I do. The
net cash outflow could not be met from operating cash and a
sell off would be required. It is doubtful if any banker would
advance my son, age 19, the necessary capital to pay my
estate taxes. 2
Selling part of the farm could fractionalize the farm so that the
remaining acreage would be too small to be operated profita-
bly.? Borrowing to pay the estate tax would add to any debt
load2l already carried by the farm. Since a tax based on fair
estate tax were based on an assessment for that use, Jones' estate would be
valued at $200,000 and the tax payable would be $32,700-a very large sum
for the Joneses, but one which the family might be able to pay and still retain
at least most of the farm. However, the farm is within 25 miles of a large
city, and speculators and developers have driven up the current price of land
in Farmer Jones' area to $2,000 an acre. Such prices, of course, assume
conversion of the land to nonfarm use-a conversion which the Jones boys
have no desire to see happen. Nonetheless, the Internal Revenue Service
under existing law assesses the farm at $2,000 an acre. The result is a valua-
tion of Jones' estate at $650,000 and a Federal tax payable of $117,200.
Obviously, the family is compelled to sell the farm, probably to a specu-
lator or developer, in order to pay the tax. The result is a federally compelled
destruction of farmland and open space in a critical environmental area on
the border of a metropolitan region, and the acceleration of urban or subur-
ban sprawl with no thought for proper land-use planning. If Farmer Jones'
house is a historic one, the result is the federally compelled destruction of a
historic house, or at least of its surroundings-the very thing the Federal
Government is supposedly trying to prevent through its National Register
and other programs. And the result for the individual family is the gross
injustice of being forced off their farm and being compelled to pay an estate
tax amounting to a confiscatory 89 percent of the value of what the estate is
worth to them for the purpose to which they wish to put it.
122 CoNG. REc. S13,750 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Mathias). See also
H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 6, at 3359. Several legislators noted that corporate
agriculture often acquires these farms that are sold for tax purposes. See e.g., 122
CONG. Rac. H10,273 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. McCollister); id. at
S13,606 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen).
22 122 CONG. Rac. S13,603 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of the late Sen.
Humphrey) (quoting a letter from Gerhard Ross).
2 Id. at S13,606 (remarks of Sen. Dole).
21 Id. at H10,268 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Keys).
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market value is predicated on a yield in excess of what the land
actually yields as a farm, the land may not have a sufficient
yield as farm land to amortize the debt.2 The estate tax, then,
operates as economic pressure to take the land out of agricul-
tural production and to develop it for nonfarm purposes."
B. The Congressional View of the Family Farm
Congress proved to be sympathetic to the plight of the
farmer for several reasons, probably not the least of which was
the influence of the farm lobby. 2 But to raise the spectre of the
farm lobby and question the sincerity of the Congressmen
speaking on behalf of farmers would be to underestimate the
cogency of the lobby's arguments and to succumb to cynicism.
One is reminded, when reading the debates on this provi-
sion, that taxation is a means to economic, social, and political
ends as well as a means to raise revenue. 28 Congress perceived
a threat to an old and venerable American institution - the
In 1940 the ratio of debt to value for American farms was, on the average, 41.5%.
By 1950 the ratio had dropped to 25.3%. In 1970 the ratio had climbed again to 42%.
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1969 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, Vol. V,
SPECIAL REPORTS, pt.2, FARM FINANCE, Table Ell, at 148 (1974); U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS,
DEPT. OF COMMERCE & U.S. BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, DEPT. OF
AGRICULTURE, vol. V. SPECIAL REPORTS, pt. 8, COOPERATIVE REPORT 1950 FARM-
MORTGAGE DEBT, Table 2, at 12 (1952).
" Congressman William S. Broomfield notes that since "the market value [of
their land] was far in excess of their ability to generate income ... the heirs of these
small operations have been forced to sell the enterprise just to pay the taxes." 122
CONG. REc. H10,272 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Broomfield). See also
H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 6, at 3376.
" The comments of Congressman Conte are illustrative: "Older dairymen com-
plained to me that they saw little chance of passing along their farms to their sons or
daughters because of the Federal inheritance tax laws, and because of this they pre-
dicted a continuing shrinkage of the dairy industry in New England." 122 CONG. REC.
H10,230 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Conte); see also H.R. REP. No.
1380, supra note 6, at 3359.
The pressure is so great that the United States Department of Agriculture esti-
mates that one quarter of all farm property sold is sold in order to pay estate taxes.
122 CONG. REc. S13,606 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen).
2 Representative Keys alluded to the lobby when she noted: "I worked hard in
committee to channel the expertise of the Kansas Livestock Association and other
Kansas farm groups into the drafting of this section." 122 CONG. REc. H10,268 (daily
ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Keys).
In view of the fact that the valuation provisions represent a new revenue loss of
$15 million for calendar year 1978 and further losses in subsequent years, the non-
revenue objectives of the provisions are indisputable. H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note
6, at 3362 (table 2).
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family farm - and the land valuation provisions of the estate
tax package are patently designed to protect that institution 9
from an often hostile economic environment created by specu-
lators, land developers, corporate agriculture, and the circum-
stances of inflation, taxation, and the nonliquid nature of capi-
tal investment in land.
Congress saw the family farm as the Jeffersonian idealY'
The family farm bears, nurtures, tempers, and sustains the
idyllic yeoman farmer, strong of body and creative of mind.
The farmer is a self-sufficient individualist, working seven days
per week to take his modest livelihood from the soil' and living
essentially in harmony with nature, uncrowded and uncor-
rupted. He is the keeper of the agrarian heritage, passing it
down generation after generation.32 The farmer represents sta-
bility and homeliness; he "put[s] down roots"; he is the
"cement of community life."33 A threat to the family farm is a
threat to the quality of American life.U
As an economic institution, the family farm was consid-
ered by Congress to be a bastion of the free enterprise system
in its ideal form: small, but efficient and competitive, eco-
nomic units.M Senator Gaylord Nelson told his senatorial col-
leagues: "on a strictly economic level, family farms ... have
11 Id. at 3359.
' See 122 CONG. REc. S13,594, S13,600 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Nelson).
It Id. at S13,593, S13,600.
32 Id. at S13,594. See also id. at S13,606 (remarks of Sen. Dole). Congressman
Sebelius read a portion of a constituent's letter telling of the loss of a portion of his
farm which had been in the family for four generations. Id. at H10,273 (daily ed. Sept.
16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Sebelius).
Given the congressional penchant toward preserving the American heritage, it is
not surprising that the original Senate amendment to H.R. 10612 (the Tax Reform
Bill), which embodied the provision for special use valuation of farmland, also included
special valuation for historic sites. SENATE FINANCE COMM., SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO
S. REP. No. 938 (pt. II), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-16 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. News 4040-42.
" 122 CONG. REC. S13,594 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Nelson).
Presumably, Senator Gaylord Nelson did not intend the first quote as a pun.
Id. at H10,272 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Bedell).
Id. at S13,606 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen).
In the category "farms with Sales of $2,500 and Over," the average size of an
individual or family farm in Kentucky is 165.7 acres; the average size of the partner-
ship farm is 260.2 acres; and the average corporate farm (including those that are close
corporations) is 534.5 acres. 1974 CENsus OF AGmCULTURE, supra note 9, Table 28, at I-
29.
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proven to be the most efficient producers of food.., that can
be found anywhere in the world.""0 Senator Lloyd Bentsen
echoed Senator Nelson's words,
[T]he family farm and ranch is vital to American agricul-
ture. Family farming and ranching is more productive than
corporate agribusiness because the man who owns the land
works 'longer and harder. The present trend against these
family owned enterprises is dangerous, and we must reverse
any policy that contributes to it.37
Family farms are the building blocks of our economic system,
and, unlike the structure of corporate agriculture, the system
of family farms keeps power decentralized in the agricultural
segment of the economy. 8 Unlike the speculator, the family
farmer toils endlessly in the Puritan tradition. 9 From the
strength of his back and the wiles of his intelligence, he earns
his daily bread while producing that of his urban neighbor. He
is the protector of our open spaces, the bulwark against the
suburbanization urged upon us by the speculator and devel-
oper. 1
The idealized portrait of the family farm that graced the
halls of Congress perhaps overlooked flaws, yet grasped essen-
tial truths. It was a portrait created by those Congressmen who
perceived a difference between wealth passed on in the form of
3'122 CONG. REc. S13,594 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Nelson).
Id. at S13,606 (remarks of Sen. Bentsen).
Id. at S13,600 (remarks of Sen. Nelson); id. at H10,269 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976)
(remarks of Rep. Keys); id. at H10,272 (remarks of Rep. Broomfield).
' Congressman William S. Broomfield, discussing the old estate tax structure,
alleged that "the Federal Government is engaged in nothing less than confiscation that
penalizes the work and savings ethic, and threatens our free enterprise system." 122
CONG. REc. H10,272 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Broomfield).
1, Id. at H10,230 (remarks of Rep. Conte).
Of the 67,179 Kentucky farm operators with sales of $2,500 and over (not including
corporate operators) only about two-thirds, 44,689, list farming as their principal occu-
pation. 1974 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 9, Table 28, at 1-29.
" 122 CONG. REc. H10,275 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Reps. Baucus and
Hammerschmidt).
As Senator Robert Dole pointed out, when farmland is valued at its fair market
value and subsequently sold to pay estate taxes and "the selling price includes develop-
ment potential [i.e., having been sold at the fair market price], the new owner must
develop the land to realize his investment." Id. at S13,606 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976)
(remarks of Sen. Dole) (emphasis added). See also H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 6,
at 3376.
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farm realty and wealth passed on in the form of readily market-
able securities.2 The former offered the devisee security
through hard work, the latter offered the legatee affluence
through indolence. These Congressmen were ready to accord
the family farm greater relief. But other Congressmen mini-
mized or denied any distinctions that warranted exceptional
treatment.43 These Congressmen were willing to afford the fam-
ily farm special valuation provisions, but they were not willing
to enact a basic tax credit that discriminated in favor of farm
realty.44 But 1976 was an election year; 5 both groups in Con-
gress wished to face their constituents in a posture of fairness
and beneficence.
C. Solution Offered by Congress
The farmland valuation package had four basic purposes:
to (1) preserve family farming operations, (2) keep land in agri-
cultural production rather than subject it to the designs of
speculators, (3) keep land from the hands of corporate agricul-
ture, and (4) preserve basic social and economic values asso-
ciated with the family farm. The means chosen to achieve these
purposes were: to (1) increase the exemption level to allow for
inflation, and (2) allow valuation of farmland based on its ac-
tual use rather than its potential use. By these means Congress
hoped to reduce the number of family farms subject to the
estate tax and to reduce the tax burden on those farms that
were subject to the tax.
2 See, e.g., 122 CoNG. REc. S13,592-94 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Nelson).
4 Id. at S13,595-97 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff).
There has long been a tension in American politics between the interests of realty
and personalty. That tension was particularly evident in the Senate debates concern-
ing the Nelson-Packwood amendment. The amendment favored a split tax credit
which would have accorded the family farm a tax exemption, in the form of a credit,
greater than that accorded most other estates. Id. at S13,590-608. Senator Edward
Kennedy offered an amendment which went even further than the Nelson-Packwood
amendment in distinguishing between personalty and realty in according a basic tax
exemption. Id. at S13,604-08. The Nelson-Packwood amendment failed. Id. at S13,608
(roll call vote). The Kennedy amendment, which was more anti-personalty than the
Nelson-Packwood amendment, also failed. Id. at S13,607 (roll call vote).
" Id. at S13,595, S13,596 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff).
13 Senator Abraham Ribicoff made pointed note of this fact. Id. at S13,601 (re-
marks of Sen. Ribicoff).
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I[. THE ACT (I.R.C. SECTION 2032A)
A. Requirements for Actual Use Valuation
For farmland to qualify for actual use valuation several
requirements must be met. First, the decedent must have been
either a citizen or resident of the United States at the time of
his death;" the realty in issue must be located in the United
States and must have been used for farming purposes on the
date of the decedent's death." The realty must also have been
owned by the decedent or a family member for at least five of
the eight years immediately prior to the decedent's death, and,
during the same period, the decedent or a family member must
have materially participated in the farming operation."
Second, the fair market value of both the real and personal
property used for farming, less the debts attributable to such
property, must equal at least fifty percent of the fair market
value of the decedent's gross estate, reduced by debts attribut-
able to property included in the gross estate. Furthermore, the
fair market value of the realty alone, reduced by debts attribut-
able to it, must equal at least twenty-five percent of the fair
market value of the decedent's gross estate, reduced by debts
attributable to the property included in the gross estate. In
other words, the value of the realty must be a substantial part
of the estate.49
Third, the land must have passed from the decedent to a
qualified heir:50 a member of decedent's family.5' Here, family
is defined as the decedent's spouse, ancestors, and lineal des-
46 I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(1)(A).
" I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(2). "Farming purposes" is further defined as the growing
of crops, including trees (not including the milling of trees), the storing of crops if at
least one-half the crops were grown on the farm, and the raising of livestock. I.R.C. §
2032A(e)(5).
" I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C); 43 Fed. Reg. 31,041 (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-
3(c)). The five years need not be consecutive. COLSON & KAHN Supplement, supra note
7, at 108.
Material participation is dealt with at length in text accompanying notes 72-149
infra.
11 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(A)(B)(C). For a discussion of problems farmers might face
depending on how their debt load is secured, see COLSON & KAHN Supplement, supra
note 7, at 104-06.
" I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(A)(ii).
5, I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(1).
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cendants (and their spouses) of the decedent's grandparents.52
To remain qualified a family member must materially partici-
pate after the decedent's death.13 It is quite clear that actual
use valuation is available only to the family farm that stays in
the family.
Fourth, the executor must elect actual use valuation. 4
Also, each person in being who has an interest in the realty
must agree to personal liability in the event the recapture pro-
visions of section 2032A are invoked.
55
B. Recapture under Section 2032A
If within fifteen years after the decedent's death the prop-
erty ceases to be used for a qualified use or is conveyed out of
the family, recapture provisions56 are triggered. The estate tax
savings that were accorded by virtue of actual use valuation are
lost and the estate tax is reassessed. However, if recapture is
triggered between the tenth and fifteenth years, the "tax is
reduced on a ratable monthly basis. 5s7 Cessation of qualified
use occurs if the property is put to nonfarm use" or if, during
any eight-year period ending after decedent's death (within the
fifteen-year limit), there were periods aggregating three years
or more during which neither the decedent nor a member of his
family materially participated in the farm operation.
59
SI.R.C. § 2032A(e)(2). Adopted children are treated as blood relatives. Id.
U I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(7)(8).
I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(1)(B),(d)(1).
" I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(6),(d)(2). COLSON & KIHN Supplement, supra note 7, at 112-
13, discusses problems that may attend this agreement. "Given this cumbersome
procedure, decedents should be watchful not to unnecessarily burden the estate by
naming remote beneficiaries." Id. at 113.
U I.R.C. § 2032A(c).
COLSON & KAHN Supplement, supra note 7, at 121; I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(3).
" I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(7)(A), referring to (b)(2)(A).
, For example, if the decedent failed to participate materially during the last two
years of his life and his devisee did materially participate for four years but then did
not for one or more years, recapture would be triggered. But if the devisee materially
participated for six years and then did not for a year or more, recapture would not be
triggered. Similarly, during any eight-year period in which the devisee holds the land,
he must materially participate for an aggregate of more than five years to avoid recap-
ture. I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(7)(B).
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C. Determination of Actual Use Value
Section 2032A provides two methods for determining the
actual use value of farmland which qualifies for special valua-
tion. One is based on the rental value of comparable land in
the area;" the other simply notes various factors that may be
considered in assessing the value such as comparable sales, real
estate tax assessment value if based on special use, and capi-
talization of the fair rental value." As a general rule, the execu-
tor may elect either method of valuation, but if there is no
comparable land in the area"2 from which the annual gross cash
rental value may be determined, then the multiple factor test
must be used.63 It should be noted that the difference between
actual use valuation and fair market value may not exceed
$500,000.64
D. Effect on Basis
The executor should be aware that election of special farm
use valuation may reduce or eliminate the various step-ups to
I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7)(A).
' I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(8).
The proposed regulations offer a helpful explanation and one example of how to
determine special use valuation. 43 Fed. Reg. 31,042-43 (1978) (Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2032A-4).
12 It is clear from I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7)(i) that the comparable land must be
"located in the locality." However, in view of the purpose of § 2032A to allow valuation
for actual use and to exclude factors based on non-farm use that tend to inflate the
value of farm land, see H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 6, at 3378, it would have been
reasonable had Congress allowed the comparable land to be located in another area,
provided it is in fact comparable farmland as to quality of soil, proximity to transporta-
tion and markets, and other factors that give land value as farmland. This would allow
use of the more precise formula, 122 CONG. Rxc. H10,269 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976)
(remarks of Rep. Keys), embodied in subsection (e)(7)(A) for valuing farmland near
urban areas for which there may be no comparable land in the area not infected with
nonfarm values. COLSON & KAHN Supplement, supra note 7, at 114, suggests the need
for interpretive guidelines. The recently issued proposed regulations note the "same
locality" requirements but add: "This requirement is not to be viewed in terms of
mileage or political divisions alone . . . The determinaton of properties which are
comparable is a factual one and must be based on numerous factors . . . ." Such
factors include similarity of soil, the degree to which the soil is depleted by the type
of crop grown, and other topographical and economic factors. 43 Fed. Reg. 31,043
(1978) (proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-4(d)).
3 I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(8).
11 I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(2).
Thus a farm with a fair market value of $1,000,000 and an actual use value of
$350,000 would be valued at $500,000 for estate tax purposes.
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the decedent's basis in the property which are available under
the carryover basis provision of the Tax Reform Act. 5 Under
the prior law,6 the basis in property acquired from a decedent
was the value of the property at the death of the decedent.
Thus if property appreciated in the hands of the decedent, that
increase in value was never subject to the income tax. The
beneficiaries received the appreciated property with a stepped-
up basis. 7
The carryover basis provision of the new law passes the
property to the devisee with the decedent's basis. The basis is
not stepped up to the value at death. Certain step-ups in basis
are available, however. Congress included a fresh start provi-
sion wherein the basis or property acquired before December
31, 1976, would be stepped up to the value on December 31,
1976. To that fresh start basis may be added (1) the value of
federal and state estate taxes which are attributable to the
appreciated value;69 (2) the value by which $60,000 (the mini-
mum basis) exceeds the sum of the fresh start basis and the
estate tax step-up; 7 and (3) the value of state death taxes paid
by the distributee.7' The new basis afforded by these step-ups
may not exceed the fair market value on the date of the dece-
dent's death.
The fair market value is considered to be its [the property's]
value for Federal estate tax purposes. Thus, if property is
valued under the.., special farm ... valuation method...,
that... special value is to be used to determine the amount
of appreciation for purposes of making all adjustments to the
carryover basis.
72
If the property is to remain an active family farm within
I.R.C. § 1023.
" I.R.C. § 1014. The section is still in effect but does not apply for persons who
died after December 31, 1976. I.R.C. § 1014(d).
'1 Congress felt that this prior provision unfairly discriminated against those who
sold property before death and that it discouraged the sale of property by people in
their later years. JoiNr COMM. ON TAXAnON, 94TH CONG., 2D Sass., GENERAL EXPLANA-
ION OF THE TAX REFORM Aar OF 1976, 552 (Comm. Print 1976).
" I.R.C. § 1023(b).
, I.R.C. § 1023(c).
, I.R.C. § 1023(d).
7' I.R.C. § 1023(e).
7 JoiNT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D Szss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACr OF 1976, 554-55 (Comm. Print 1976).
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the decedent's family, any resulting loss in basis step-ups is
irrelevant. Yet the loss may be of importance if the devisee
plans to hold the farm and materially participate only long
enough to escape the recapture provisions of section 2032A, for
then his basis would be limited to the special farm valuation
of the property and would render the step-ups unavailable be-
yond that amount.
III. MATERIAL PARTICIPATION
Material participation is crucial.' 3 It is necessary both to
qualify for special use valuation and to avoid recapture of the
taxes that might have been levied on the fair market valuation.
As the following discussion will indicate, the family farmer who
actively operates his farm, either by himself or with the aid of
his family, has materially participated for the purposes of sec-
tion 2032A. Material participation, however, must be a concern
of the family farmer who decides to retire from full-time opera-
tion of the farm. If operation of the farm devolves on family
members, most likely a daughter or son, the Act still permits
special valuation." However, if the farmer does not turn over
operations to a family member but instead rents the land to
someone else or leaves it idle, the material participation re-
quirement might bar special valuation at the farmer's death
and require the land to be valued at its fair market value.
Similarly, if the devisee qualifies for special valuation but later
declines active participation in farming and prefers to rent the
land to another, the material participation requirement may
activate the recapture provisions of the Act.
7 5
It is important, then, to define material participation. Sec-
tion 2032A provides: "Material participation shall be deter-
mined in a manner similar to the manner used for purposes of
paragraph (1) of section 1402(a) (relating to net earnings from
self-employment)."" With the caveat that "in a manner
71 The recently amended Kentucky provision does not require material participa-
tion by either the decedent or the qualified heir. KRS § 140.300-.360 (Supp. 1978). For
a brief explanation of the Kentucky provision, see note 2 supra.
7, I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(c)(ii).
,3 See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra for a discussion of the recapture provi-
sions.
' I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(6).
The proposed regulations issued under § 2032 provide that "[tihe regulations
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similar to" may allow for a variation in the definition of mate-
rial participation which a court might impose for section 2032A
purposes, one must look to section 1402(a) and the regulations,
revenue rulings, and court decisions based on it for a definition
of material participation.
A. Material Participation under Section 1402(a)
Section 1402(a) defines earnings from self-employment for
the purpose of taxing those earnings to finance the federal Old
Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund (OASI). 77 The pur-
pose of OASI is to provide security to those whose income is
subject to the ravages of advancing age, disability, and death.
To be eligible to receive OASI benefits one must have contrib-
uted to OASI. Most contribute through wage deductions
(F.I.C.A.); however, self-employed individuals have no em-
ployer to withhold F.I.C.A. deductions and therefore must
compute their own tax based on their self employed income.
Income from rents is generally excluded from self-employment
income and not taxed under OASI. The rationale is that rents
are not subject to diminution due to advancing age, disability
or death of the recipient because rents are not dependent on the
physical labor of the recipient. However, rent received by those
who materially participate in agricultural production on land
they have rented to another is classified as self-employment
income. This income is taxed under section 1402(a) and the
material participant is later able to receive benefits from
OASI7 8 The rationale for this exception to the general exclu-
sion is that such rental income does depend on the activity of
the land owner. 9
Regulations and revenue rulings have been issued which
attempt to define material participation under section 1402(a).
under section 1402(a)(1) are applicable for purposes of this section to the extent they
are not inconsistent with its express requirements." 43 Fed. Reg. 31,041 (1978) (Pro-
posed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(d)).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(4), 411(a)(1) (1970). See I.R.C. ch. 2, and 42 U.S.C. ch. 7
(1970).
7' Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(a), T.D. 6691, 1963-2 C.B. 347.
S. REP. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3884; Celebrezze v. Miller, 333 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1964); Celebrezze v.
Maxwell, 315 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963).
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The regulations note that farm rental income qualifies as self-
employment income if:
(i) The income is derived under an arrangement between
the owner... of land and another person which provides that
such other person shall produce agricultural or horticultural
commodities on such land, and that there shall be material
participation by the owner... in the production or the man-
agement of the production..., and
(ii) There is material participation by the owner ....
The agreement may be either oral or written and must
contemplate material participation by the owner in either pro-
duction or the management of production."1 The contemplated
participation must be carried out by actual material participa-
tion. The actual participation need not be material with re-
spect to only production or only management; the owner may
materially participate by active involvement in both manage-
ment and production so that his total involvement can be con-
sidered material. In this context, production refers to both the
physical work of farming and the furnishing of tools and ma-
chinery. Management refers to the active and regular process
of inspection, consultation, and decision.82
Both contemplated and actual material participation
must be proved." Yet, actual participation is generally con-
strued to indicate that the arrangement, whether oral or
vaguely written, did in fact contemplate material participation
by the owner. 4 However, participation gratuitously offered will
0 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b), T.D. 6691, 1963-2 C.B. 347 (emphasis added).
1 Id. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(2); McCormick v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 783 (10th Cir.
1972); 43 Fed. Reg. 31,041 (1978) (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(d)(1)).
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3), T.D. 6691, 1963-2 C.B. 347.
13 Foster v. Celebrezze, 313 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd sub nom Foster v.
Flemming, 190 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Iowa, 1960) (on other grounds).
11 Celebrezze v. Benson, 314 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1963) (participation by owner
proved agreement continued despite lapse of lease); Whitlow v. Celebrezze, UNEML.
INs. RsP. (CCH) 16140 (S.D. Ill. 1964) (material participation held not merely gratui-
tous). But see Foster v. Celebrezze, 313 F.2d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 1963) (in dicta the court
noted: "volunteer services . . . on the part of the landlord in the absence of any
arrangement... will not suffice.").
It is also appropriate to note here that the owner once was able to participate
materially through an agent. Rev. Rul. 64-32, 1964-1 C.B. 319. Section 1402(a) has
since been amended to preclude vicarious material participation. Pub. L. No. 93-368,
§ 10(b), 88 Stat. 422 (1974). Amendments to the regulations have also been proposed
which reiterate the preclusion of material participation through an agent. 43 Fed. Reg.
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not support a finding of material participation."
Just what quantum of participation constitutes material
participation is difficult to define. "[N]o hard and fast rules
can be laid down for determining in all cases the physical work
and/or management decisions needed to establish the degree of
participation contemplated by the statute.""8 However, as a
practical accommodation to the taxpayer,87 the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) has formulated four tests of material partici-
pation against which the taxpayer may measure his activities.
One need meet only one of the following tests to qualify as
materially participating:
Test No. 1. You do any three of the following:
(1) advance, pay, or stand good for at least half the direct
costs of producing the crop;
(2) furnish at least half the tools, equipment and livestock
used in producing the crop;
(3) advise and consult with your tenant periodically; and
(4) inspect production activities periodically.
Test No. 2. You regularly and frequently make, or take an
important part in making, management decisions substan-
tially contributing to or affecting the success of the enter-
prise.
Test No. 3. You work 100 hours or more, spread over a pe-
riod of 5 weeks or more, in activities connected with produc-
ing the crop.
Test No. 4. You do things which, considered in their total
effect, show that you are materially and significantly in-
volved in the production of the farm commodities.8
31,040 (1978) (Proposed Treas. Reg. 31,040 (1978) (proposed Tress. Reg. §
1.1402(a)(4)(b)(5)).
43 Fed. Reg. 31,041 (1978) (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(d)(1)). For a case
where the court considered whether labor was gratuitous, see Whitlow v. Celebrezze,
UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) T 16,140 (S.D. Ill. 1964). This case is discussed in the text
accompanying note 108 infra.
U Rev. Rul. 57-58, 1957-1 C.B. 270, at 271.
" The IRS defines material participation with a series of examples. Treas. Reg. §
1.1402(a)-4(b)(6), T.D. 6691, 1963-2 C.B. 347; Rev. Rul. 57-58, 1957-1 C.B. 270. For
additional examples, see 43 Fed. Reg. 31,041-42 (1978) (Proposed Treas. Reg. §
20.2032A-3(F)).
'" INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION No. 225,
FARMER'S TAX GUIDE 53 (1978).
The recently issued proposed regulations for § 2032A essentially reiterate the Tax
Guide tests; they state:
No single factor is determinative of the presence of material participation,
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1. Test One
Test One imposes a rigorous standard and seems to envi-
sion a joint enterprise arrangement in which management and
the costs of production are shared. Such costs might include
feed, seed, plants, fertilizers, fuel, machinery, repairs, pesti-
cides, herbicides, transportation, livestock, and veterinarian
expenses. Bridie v. Ribicoff5 5 represents a classic example of a
farmer who met the standards of Test One. Bridie owned a
farm of 203 acres primarily devoted to raising livestock. On the
farm were two houses with barns adjacent to each. Bridie lived
in one; the tenant lived in the other. Bridie supplied one-half
the livestock, made advances for major purchases (one-half
subsequently repaid to him by his tenant), inspected, watered
stock, drove the tractor for haying, and innoculated the soy-
beans. The tenant supplied his labor, all machinery and all
feed (after consultation with Bridie as to type of feed), and the
other one-half of the costs. They made joint decisions as to
management and marketing. The profits were equally divided.
The court found a joint venture existed in which Bridie materi-
ally participated."
It should be emphasized that fifty percent or greater finan-
cial participation without either consultation or inspection is
insufficient under this test. Bryant, in Bryant v. Celebrezze,91
but physical work and participation in management decisions are the princi-
pal factors to be considered. As a minimum, the decedent and/or a family
member must regularly advise or consult with the other managing party on
the operation of the business. While they need not make all final manage-
ment decisions alone, the decedent and family members must participate in
making a substantial number of these decisions. Additionally, production
activities on the land should be inspected regularly by the family partici-
pant, and funds must be advanced or financial responsibility assumed for a
substantial portion of the expense involved in the operation of the farm or
other business in which the real property is used. In the case of a farm, a
substantial portion of the machinery, implements, and livestock used in the
production activities should also be furnished by the owner and other family
members.
43 Fed. Reg. 31,041 (1978) (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(d)(2)).
" 194 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
" Id. Accord, Celebrezze v. Wifstad, 314 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1963) (owner paid i
costs, selected and supplied seed, retained ultimate control but visited farm only
occasionally); Colegate v. Gardner, 265 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (owner paid ,2
costs, made important managerial decisions, rarely inspected work of experienced
tenant, supervised her share at harvest).
11 229 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
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met one-half the costs but left the operations entirely to the
tenant, her brother. The court noted:
She did reside on the farm and remained in actual possession
of the land .... [I]f Beulah had possessed the skills required
for farm management her brother would have paid heed....
It is noted, however, that Beulah apparently did not possess
the requisite skills .... [She did not actually participate.]
Not a single inistance has been shown where the plaintiff
made an important decision ... or where her presence was
of a significant value to a decision made by Herbert [her
brother] ."
The court found that Bryant had not materially participated.
In Vance v. Ribicoff, 3 Vance rented out fifty-two acres,
supplied all tobacco plants, all spray, all sticks, the drying
barn, and a mule and plow. Her tenant supplied the labor. No
agent was employed. Relying in part on Harper v. Flemming,94
a case in which the court had found material participation
through an agent, the court noted that the size of the operation
was not important, stressed the substantial amount of Vance's
financial contribution, and found material participation.,'
However, Vance, unlike Bryant, regularly walked past the to-
bacco crop and advised her tenant when it needed plowing or
when she found worms in the tobacco. For the most part, she
relied upon her skilled tenant but the court held that her advice
and consultation, together with her financial investment,
amounted to material participation.
In discussing inspection, advice, and consultation, the
court has not imposed impossible standards. In Celebrezze v.
Wifstad," the court found that six to eight visits during the
growing season and periodic phone calls, supplementing a one-
half financial contribution, were sufficient to meet the material
participation requirement. During consultation with his ten-
ant, Wifstad made managerial decisions. In Colegate v.
Id. at 335.
202 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Tenn. 1961). The Vance lease is discussed in the Appen-
dix at note 161. The facts of Vance seem to be the basis for example 2 in the proposed
regulations. 43 Fed. Reg. 31.041-42 (1978) (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(f)).
" 288 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1961).
202 F. Supp. 790, 795 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
" 314 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1963).
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Gardner,7 Colegate made only two inspections and supervised
the harvesting of her share of the crop. The court found these
activities sufficient because her tenant was an experienced
farmer and long time neighbor. On the other hand, in Bryant
v. Celebrezze5 Bryant made no inspections because her brother
"knew best what to do about it more than I did"9 and because
she was not well; the court found no material participation
even though Bryant met one-half the costs. It should also be
noted that inspection and consultation must be directed to-
ward production - the what, when, where, and how of farming
- and not simply toward the preservation of one's realty."'0
2. Test Two
Test Two envisions management decisions that are made
throughout the year. General policy planning at the outset of
the season is insufficient. The owner must decide matters such
as "when to plant, cultivate, spray or harvest, what items to
buy, sell or rent, what records to keep, what reports to make,
and what bills to pay and when" 10' and in which government
programs to participate.102 Retaining ultimate control over
decision-making is important. In Hoffman v. Gardner, Hoff-
man lived 400 miles from his farms but the court found he
"completely directed the farming operations" through direct
consultation or the agency of his brother-in-law. The court
noted that: "In order to 'materially participate,' the statute
does not require the farm owner to settle all the problems, or
even all the important problems .... Claimant's participation
need only be of substantial value or importance." 03 Hoffman
, 265 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
,S 229 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
" Id. at 332.
'" Hoffman v. Ribicoff, 305 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1962) (no material participation);
Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 246 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Mo. 1965), rev'd sub nom. Hoffman v.
Gardner, 369 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1966) (different interpretation of facts). The plaintiff
in these cases is the same Hoffman but the cases involve different farms. Although the
results are different, the facts are not significantly different. Subsequent decisions
distinguish the facts in the first Hoffman case. See e.g., McCormick v. Richardson,
UNEMPL. INs. REP. (CCH) 16,068 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
"II J. O'BYRNE, FARM INCOME TAX MANuAI (5th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
O'BYRNE].
102 Hoffman v. Gardner, 369 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1966).
11 Id. at 841, 842 (citations omitted).
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paid all the costs of grass seed and fertilizer and one-half the
cost of corn seed and bailing; determined the time and fields
for planting and the time of harvesting and spraying; and in-
structed on fencing, terracing, marketing and drainage. He also
decided in which government farm programs he would partici-
pate.1 0
4
How actively the owner must exercise his authority de-
pends, in part, on the type of farming done and the age of the
owner. In Conley v. Ribicoff "5 Conley lived in California and
rented his farm to former neighbors in South Dakota. He vis-
ited to inspect and consult twice each year for periods as long
as two weeks. Prior to the season he issued directions on plant-
ing, seed quality, and what land to fallow in the summer. His
decisions were based largely on his long experience in farming
that same land and on the previous year's yield. The tenants
did all the labor, paid all costs, furnished all equipment, and
received two-thirds of the crop. The court found that Conley
materially participated because there were no other significant
contributions he could make to the management of farm pro-
duction: "Conley could not have contributed anything by
planting his feed in the furrows and watching his grain grow;
to use his own words '[he] could of done no more if there daily
all year."'10
3. Test Three
Test Three seems to be less demanding. If one works in
production for 100 hours or more over a period of five or more
"I Id. Accord, McCormick v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1972); Foster v.
Celebrezze, 313 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1963), reversing sub nom. Foster v. Flemming, 190
F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Lee v. Richardson, UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 16,402
(E.D.N.C. 1971).
1- 294 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1961).
IN Id. at 195. Cf. Stueckle v. Celebrezze, UNEMPL. INs. REIP. (CCH) 14,033 (E.D.
Wash. 1965), where the court seemed to expect less activity because of Stueckle's age.
"That she had authority to control the operation, which she did not always use, would
seem to me to be sufficient to qualify her . . . ." But see Millemon v. Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, 256 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Okla. 1966) wherein the court
stressed the exercise of a "substantial degree of managerial prerogative." Id. at 940.
Millemon lived 11 miles from the farm and her son, an experienced farmer, operated
her farm and his own. "It is not shown herein where her presence was of significant
value to any decision by her son." Id. She was not found to have materially partici-
pated.
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weeks during a year, one has materially participated. In other
words, by working forty minutes each day during the year, one
qualifies, but not by working twenty hours each day for four
weeks and never thereafter.1 17 Only one case involves this test.
In Whitlow v. Celebrezze, "I Whitlow and his tenant made joint
decisions and jointly worked the farm. The court noted that
Whitlow worked 200 hours spread over five weeks doing such
things as harvesting, weeding, mowing, maintaining fences,
purchasing, and applying phosphate. The court held that these
activities were not gratuitous because they had a direct bearing
on production and therefore a direct bearing on Whitlow's
share of the profit.0 9
O'Byrne' 1° notes that for purposes of meeting this test
emphasis should be placed on work - physical labor - and not
on managerial-type work because the tax administrators have
"a peasant approach to farming, a stereotype of a man and his
horse tilling the soil in the fading sunset." He stresses that
physical activity "is still the best proof of participation."'
4. Test Four
Test Four is a catch-all. The claimant may, under this
test, allege material participation based on the totality of fac-
tors even though he fails to satisfy the relatively specific stan-
dards of the other three tests. Celebrezze v. Miller"1 2 is a good
example. Miller, eighty-two years old, had an oral agreement
with ,his tenant. Miller paid one-third of the cost of fertilizer,
pesticides, herbicides, and labor. He consulted, advised, and
inspected three or four times each month. In return he received
one-third of the crop or suffered one-third of the loss. His ten-
ant supplied all of the seed, covered the remainder of other
,0 O'BYRNa, supra note 101, at 900-91.
'°8 UNEMPL. INs. REP. (CCH) 16,140 (S.D. Ill. 1964).
,0, Mere gratuitous labor is not contemplated by the parties under such an ar-
rangement. See text accompanying notes 81-85 supra for a discussion of the required
arrangement.
I John O'Byrne is a noted authority on taxation as it affects farmers. See note
101 supra for a citation to his FARM INcoam TAX MANUAL.
" O'BRYNE, supra note 101, at 911.
The proposed regulations note that "physical work and participation in manage-
ment decisions are the principal factors to be considered." 43 Fed. Reg. 31,041 (1978)
(Proposed Treas. Reg. § 420.2032A-3(d) (2)) (emphasis added).
112 333 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1964).
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costs, and provided the labor. The court found a mutual under-
taking in which Miller materially participated.1
3
5. The Risk Element
It is extremely important to note that in all the cases cited
here under section 1402(a), the owner shared in a percentage
of the crop and was not entitled to a flat, money rent unrelated
to actual production. In many of the cases the courts have
explicitly noted that this crop-share arrangement, while not
alone sufficient, is important in finding material participation
and in distinguishing the crop-share farmer or joint venturer
from a mere landlord.
The policy behind the law is, of course, the reason for the
distinction." 4 The income of the crop-share farmer or the joint
venturer is dependent on his participation. Attendant to his
participation, he shares an element of risk. The greater the
landowner's contribution in time and money, the greater his
risk. The courts, therefore, often focus on risk as a measure of
contribution, particularly under Test Four. In Henderson v.
Flemming,"I Henderson, ninety years old and confined to a
wheelchair, had a crop-sharing arrangement with her son. Four
hundred acres were charged to his account, 200 to hers. Her son
did all the physical work. She made important decisions and
furnished much of the money ($1,100 each year). The court
held that her son was her agent and that the relationship gave
her vicarious personal participation. But the risk she took was
important:
One is hardly a mere landlord in the traditional sense if he
must risk considerable funds in addition to the land in the
success of the venture. And what he gets-or hopes to get-is
more than rent. It is profit from the operation of a business,
a business fraught with financial risks .... "
"' Id. See also Celebrezze v. Benson, 314 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1963).
2u See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra for this policy.
"' 283 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1960).
I" Id. at 888. Bridie v. Ribicoff, 194 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa 1961), distinguishes
profit from rent on the basis of the risk attendent to profit. See also Colegate v.
Gardner, 265 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Ohio 1967), and Celebrezze v. Miller, 333 F.2d 29 (5th
Cir. 1964) (both quoting the language from Henderson quoted above). See note 84
supra for a discussion of the use of agency under the material participation test.
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Of the reported cases, Celebrezze v. Maxwell '17 represents
the claimant with the least contribution. Maxwell supplied the
land and paid one-quarter of the expenses for fertilizer, pesti-
cides, and herbicides used in conjunction with cotton produc-
tion. Maxwell had five tenants: three grew only corn, one grew
only cotton, and one grew both corn and cotton. Maxwell re-
ceived one-third of the corn crop and one-quarter of the cotton
crop as rent. A total of seventy-five acres were in production.
The arrangement was oral. The court held Maxwell was no
more than a landlord because there was: (1) no arrangement
to manage, (2) no actual management, (3) no substantial fin-
ancial contribution in relation to the tenants' contribution, (4)
no dependence of the tenants on his advice, (5) no agency es-
tablished,1 8 and (6) no inspection. In sum, Maxwell took mini-
mal risk and therefore did not materially participate."9 Since
Maxwell's income depended on production and yet he failed to
qualify, it would be difficult to prove that a landlord who re-
ceived a flat, money rent, in no way dependent on production,
was materially involved in production.1 0
6. Summary
The material participation test seems well-suited for the
purposes underlying section 1402(a) - to finance the OASI.
OASI functions as an income insurance program to provide
security for those whose ability to labor has become impaired
in their later years. Those who do not depend upon labor for
their income, those who do not "materially participate," do not
117 315 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963).
MS See note 84 supra for a discussion of the use of agency under the material
participation test.
", 315 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963).
The proposed regulations stress active participation and financial risk as ele-
ments of material participation. They explicitly state:
Passively collecting rents, salaries, draws, dividends, or other business is not
sufficient for material participation, nor is merely advancing capital and
reviewing a crop plan or other business proposal and financial reports each
season or business year.
43 Fed. Reg. 31,040 (1978) (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(a)). But see COLSON &
KAHN Supplement, note 7 supra, at 108: "Presumably, a farmer can materially partici-
pate under a cash rental arrangement as well as under a crop share arrangement." See
also O'BRYNE, note 101 supra, at 907. O'Bryne notes, without citation, the opinion of
an administrative law judge finding material participation by a cash-rent landlord.
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need the benefits of the government income insurance. The
major anomaly first presented by the courts' interpretation of
section 1402(a) and, later by the Treasury Department's inter-
pretation of the section-vicarious material participation
solely through an agent- has been removed by Congress. 12'
The foregoing cases which turned on vicarious participation
must be read with this legislative change in mind. Material
participation may no longer be imputed to the landlord from
the agent's activities, but the courts' construction of the essen-
tial elements of material participation in cases with agents
should be the same as in those cases without agents. It is the
participation that is important, whether performed by or
through an agent. However, participating vicariously is really
no different than being a passive landlord; the elimination of
the possibility of participation through an agent makes section
1402(a) more harmonious with its underlying purpose.
For present purposes the question is: Does the material
participation requirement adequately serve the underlying
purposes of section 2032A?
B. Material Participation and Section 2032A
As discussed above, section 2032A has four primary pur-
poses: (1) to preserve the family farming operation, (2) to keep
land in agricultural production, (3) to preclude dominance by
corporate agriculture, and (4) to preserve the economic and
social values associated with the family farm. Congress hoped,
with section 2032A, to further these purposes and to ameliorate
the economic pressures of inflation and speculation that tend
to force devisees to sell part or all of the land in order to pay
estate taxes. 122 In according this benefit Congress made the
legislation narrow in its application, particularly the require-
ment that the owner or a family member must have materially
participated in farming the land prior to the owner's death and
that a qualified heir must continue to participate materially
after the owner's death.121 It is arguable that this requirement
narrows the applicability of section 2032A so as to thwart maxi-
mum realization of its broad purposes.
222 Pub. L. No. 93-368, § 10(b), 88 Stat. 422 (1974) (amending I.R.C. § 1402(a)).
in See section I supra for a discussion of the legislative history of § 2032A.
'' See section I supra for a discussion of the requirements of § 2032A.
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Several hypothetical examples will serve to illustrate:
(1) Farmer A married late in life and now, after working
the family farm for thirty-five years, he wishes to retire from
active farming. His daughter, age seventeen, has plans to at-
tend an agricultural college and will not take her degree for five
more years; then she would like to farm the family land. If he
retires and rents the land to a neighbor and subsequently dies
four years later, before his daughter actively participates, the
material participation test will not be met and the land will be
valued at its fair market value for estate tax purposes.
(2) Farmer B dies without qualified heirs who might
materially participate after his death. He devised the farm to
the second son of his best friend. The material participation
requirement cannot be met and the land will not be accorded
special use valuation for estate tax purposes even though the
neighbor's son intends to use the land as a family farm.
(3) Farmer C dies. His son is a doctor; his daughter is an
attorney. Neither wishes to farm actively but having been de-
vised the family farm they wish to keep it in the family for
possible use by future generations and, in the meantime, rent
the farm to X who will live on it and farm the land. For want
of material participation the land cannot be accorded special
use valuation.
(4) Farmer D dies and devises the land to his children,
none of whom wish to farm or even to keep the farm. Y wishes
to buy the farm and use it as his family's farm. For purposes
of valuing D's estate. the farm must be valued at its fair market
value because the devisees did not materially participate.
In each of the examples the farm must be valued at its fair
market value because the material participation requirement
is not met. This valuation may force the sale of all or part of
the farm, attach a value to the land which cannot be realized
in agricultural production, or so add to the debt load that the
land cannot sustain the burden. Fair market valuation, then,
may either force the sale of the land to corporate agriculture
or to developers or force a change in use that would offer a yield
commensurate with fair market valuation. In either event, the
land would be lost as a family farm. '
"' See section I A supra for a discussion of the economic problems faced by the
family farm.
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The hypothetical examples suggest situations in which the
material participation requirement, as narrowly drafted, might
frustrate maximum realization of the broad purpose of the Act.
To see if this requirement can be broadened, it is necessary to
divide it into its two parts: "material participation"'125 and
"qualified heir" or "member of the .. . family."' 28
1. Material Participation
"Material participation," as it has been defined by the
courts, Congress, and the IRS, is detailed above. Active per-
sonal participation is required. Might "material participation"
be broadened in scope for purposes of section 2032A? It was
previously noted that the section provides that "material par-
ticipation shall be determined in a manner similar to the man-
ner used for purposes of ... section 1402(a)."' 27 This "similar
to" language suggests that the courts could give a more expan-
sive reading to "material participation" for section 2032A pur-
poses. The different legislative purposes underlying sections
1402(a) and 2032A suggest the test need not be applied identi-
cally for each section.'1
When the courts first considered the material participa-
tion test under section 1402(a) they held that one could materi-
ally participate through an agent.' 2' The IRS relented to the
interpretation' 31 until Congress acted and explicitly excluded
vicarious participation.' 3' Precluding participation through an
agent was perfectly consistent with the purpose of section
1402(a) .'3
Initially, it might seem that allowing participation
through an agent would be consistent with section 2032A and
The free market purist might suggest that the land ought to pass to the highest
bidder but such considerations are beyond the scope of this Note.
" I.R.C. §§ 2032A(b)(1)(C)(ii), (e)(6).
' I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(1)-(2). See also I.R.C. §§ 2032A (b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(C)(ii),
(c)(1), (7).
I" I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(6).
1' See text following note 45 supra for the purposes of § 2032A and the text
following note 77 supra for the purposes of § 1402(a).
21 See, e.g., Harper v. Flemming, 288 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1961).
3' Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(5), T.D. 6691, 1963-2 C.B. 347; Rev. Rul 64-32,
1964-1 C.B. 314.
,' Pub. L. No. 93-368, § 10(b), 88 Stat. 422 (1974) (amending I.R.C. § 1402(a)).
222 See text following note 77 supra for the purpose of OASI.
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that the "similar to" language should be utilized to permit
vicarious participation. In the first example above, the estate
of Farmer A would be afforded special use valuation if he were
allowed to participate through an agent. The estate of Farmer
C would also benefit by special use valuation if the arrange-
ment with X were drawn to make X an agent of Farmer C's
children. The rent would probably have to be proportionate to
production-a crop-share arrangement exposing the lessors to
entreprenurial risks. '33 Vicarious participation could thus
bridge gaps between periods of direct participation.
But it may be seen that the material participation test
does not unjustifiably narrow the applicability of section
2032A, and it would be unfortunate if the courts were to use the
"similar to" opening to permit vicarious participation. Actual
participation is an important part of the social and economic
institutions and values Congress sought to preserve through the
broad purposes of the Act. Vicarious participation divorces
ownership from production. In preserving the family farm,
Congress wished to preclude the separation of ownership and
production. '34
In addition to the agency limitation, the other require-
ments for material participation under section 1402(a) are well
suited for the purposes of section 2032A.
2. Who Must Participate
Congress has unduly narrowed the applicability of section
2032A in defining who must participate in the farming opera-
tions, the second component of the material participation re-
quirement. Prior to the transfer at death, there must have been
"material participation by the decedent or a member of the
decedent's family. 11 3 5 After the transfer, there must be
"material participation by [a] qualified heir or any member
of [the qualifed heir's] family." 3 ' A "member of family" is,
with respect to a decedent or a qualified heir, an ancestor of
such person, a lineal descendant of the grandparent of such
'I See notes 114-20 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the necessity
that the lessor be exposed to financial risk.
134 122 CONG. REc. S13,595 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Packwood).
13 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C)(ii).
'M I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(7)(B)(ii), (c)(I).
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person, the spouse of such person, or the spouse of such per-
son's descendant. 3 A "qualified heir" is a member of the dece-
dent's family who acquired the property, directly or indirectly,
from the decedent." 8 Thus the literal language of the Act does
not afford the benefits of special use valuation to family farms
that no longer remain within the family and does not attach
significance to the fact that the farm might be used as a family
farm by a different family. Because the accepted rule of statu-
tory construction is that explicit statutory language controls
over legislative history neither the courts nor the treasury de-
partment can read the restriction out of the Act."9 In view of
the legislative history and the problem Congress sought to
ameliorate, this express denial of special use valuation upon
inter-family transfers is difficult to explain.
The limitation of the benefit to intra-family transfer may
represent a compromise between revenue needs and tax relief.
On the other hand, it may represent an undue and short-
sighted deference to the family farm when the farm is passed
within the family from one generation to another. The congres-
sional debates are replete with adulation and reverence for
those farm lands that have been worked by the same family
generation after generation.'40 While such dedication to the
family land may well give pause and evoke admiration, the fact
that certain land has remained in one family for an extended
period of time is not the heart and soul of the family farm as
an economic and social institution. The fact that one's grand-
parents are buried on the knoll in the west forty may add
sentiment to the land. But the dedication of the generation
presently working the land, whether it be the first generation
of that family or the tenth, provides the economic competi-
tiveness, the social stability, and the bulwark against corporate
agriculture; that dedication is what keeps the land agricultur-
ally productive.
' I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(z).
,' I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(1).
' ' The Technical Corrections Bill of 1977 (H.R. 6715) reaffirms that special valua-
tion is to be afforded only to that farm property which remains in the decedent's
family. STAFF OF THE JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESs., DFSCRIPrION
OF H.R. 6715: TEmNimC, CLEPIC AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS OF THE TAX REFORM
Acr OF 1976, at 15 (Comm. Print 1977).
to See, e.g., 122 CONG. RaC. H10,273 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep.
Sebelius).
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Congress has adopted a rather restrictive definition of the
family farm by focusing on the destination of the transfer: has
the land remained in the family? A broader definition, more in
harmony with the broad purposes of section 2032A, would focus
on the use of the land after the transfer: is it being used as a
family farm? The economic and social objectives Congress
sought to achieve flow from the use of land as a small, agricul-
tural, economic unit: owned, occupied, and worked by a small,
cohesive, social unit whose rewards are based directly on pro-
duction. The family farm in this broad, institutional sense' is
no less a family farm if transferred to a different family.
The hypothetical examples offered above 42 may serve to
illustrate this point. Under the present congressional scheme,
Farmer B's estate would be denied special use valuation be-
cause Farmer B, being without progeny, devised the farm to
another family.4 3 The broader view would see that the land was
a family farm at all times before and after the transfer. The fact
that a different family has the land is of little social, and of no
economic consequence. The example of Farmer D's land poses
no difficulty within the broad view. Farmer D's children do not
wish to farm.144 However, if the farm is valued at its highest and
best use, it may be beyond the financial reach of a subsequent
family farmer like Y. Farm use valuation would be an incentive
' See H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 6, at 3359.
242 See text following note 123 supra for those hypotheticals.
"I Actually, there is one possible solution to this problem. I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(2)
states that a "legally adopted child" of an individual shall be treated as a child of such
individual by blood for purposes of determining if that child is a family member of
the decedent. Therefore, Farmer B might arrange to adopt his best friend's second son.
KRS§405.390 provides that an adult person may be adopted "as provided by law
for the adoption of a child and with the same legal effect." According to
KRS§199.520(2), an adopted child is considered for purposes of inheritance and succes-
sion and all other legal considerations as "the natural legitimate child of the parents
adopting it the same as if born of their bodies." It should be noted, however, that the
status of the adopted child under a will or trust is an unsettled area of the law in
Kentucky, particularly where class gifts are involved. See Note 59 Ky. L.J. 921 (1971).
After such adoption, an existing will should be republished and reviewed, or a new will
executed, to ensure that the testator's intent to include the adopted person is clear.
'- The question may fairly be asked: At what price did Farmer D's children sell
the land? If it was sold at its highest and best fair market value, there would be no
justification to accord the estate special use value. If, however, the land was sold solely
for farming (i.e. with a restrictive covenant) at below the fair market value, then the
estate should perhaps be accorded special use valuation.
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for D's children to sell to a farmer.'45
The circumstances that befell Farmer C's land clearly take
the land outside the scope of section 2032A. The land is no
longer used as a family farm. Congress might well wish to deny
tax benefits in this instance so as to discourage, or at least not
to reward, the development of a rentier class. While the land
remains a small, agricultural unit, it is not owned, occupied
and worked by a small, cohesive social unit. Fixed money rents,
not proportionate to or dependent upon production, may sup-
plant a crop-share arrangement.' Ownership is separated, for
an indefinite period of time, from occupancy and work.
Farmer A's situation poses some difficulty.'47 The gap be-
tween periods of direct participation is anticipated to be brief
and for a definite period of time. Both before and after the gap
the use of the land will meet the criteria of the broad view;
indeed it will meet the criteria of the current narrower view.
But during the gap the use of the land may not meet the cri-
teria of a family farm; ownership would be separated from
occupancy and production. Just where to draw the line is al-
ways a difficult question in close cases. Congress has chosen to
limit gaps in material participation to periods of no more than
three years during any consecutive eight-year period."' It can-
not be said that the three-year figure is unwarranted or irra-
tional. Yet if Farmer A only semi-retires, rents the land on a
crop-share basis, assumes entreprenurial risk, regularly in-
145 Of course, the purchaser would have to be subjected to the recapture provisions
provided in the Act.
"I Under such fixed-money arrangements, the owner probably will not materially
participate even vicariously under the test formulated in Henderson v. Flemming, 283
F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1960). See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra, for discussion of
Henderson. See also, H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 6, at 3377. ("The mere passive
rental of property will not qualify."), and 43 Fed. Reg. 31,040 (1978) (Proposed Trees.
Reg. § 20.2032A-3 (a)).
The proposed regulations offer an example similar to the hypothetical involving
Farmer C. The proposed regulations note that Farmer C's children could qualify by
taking an active role in the management of farming by making important decisions
and regularly inspecting the farming operation. 43 Fed. Reg. 31,041-42 (1978) (Pro-
posed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(f)).
" Similar situations may be envisioned, such as the farmer who, having become
an invalid, conveys his farm to T in trust, while retaining equitable life estates for his
wife and himself, with a remainder in legal and equitable fee to his children.
I" This includes any consecutive eight-year period commencing eight years prior
to the decedent's death and ending fifteen years after decedent's death. I.R.C. §
2032A(c) (7).
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spects, and consults with his lessee, there may in fact be no gap
in material participation."' In this close case, wise estate plan-
ning could assure special use valuation for the land.
C. Summary and Recommendation
It may be said, then, that the material participation re-
quirement, as developed under section 1402(a), is fully conso-
nant with the objectives of section 2032A. Above all, the fam-
ily farm concept which Congress sought to preserve requires
active participation, and the material participation test rep-
resents the minimum standard of participation necessary for
designation as a family farm. That standard should not be
weakened. But in the interest of the broad objectives of section
2032A, the applicability of the section should be broadened by
redefining the class of transferees who might materially partici-
pate. The definition should allow transfer, either directly or
indirectly, to persons outside the decedent's family. The
change could beaccomplished by substituting the following for
the definition of "qualified heir":
1 50
(1) Qualified Transferee. The term "qualified transferee"
means, with respect to any property, one who acquired the
property from the decedent or the decedent's devisee or heir
and who puts the property to qualified use. If a qualified
transferee disposes of any interest in qualified real property,
the subsequent transferee may be thereafter treated as a
qualified transferee.
It would also be necessary to substitute "qualified transferee"
for "qualified heir" where that latter term is used in section
2032A and to substitute the following for section 2032A(c)(1):
(1) Imposition of additional estate tax. If within 15 years
after the decedent's death and before the death of the quali-
fied transferee, any qualified transferee ceases to use the
qualified real property which was acquired (or passed) from
the decedent for a qualified use, then, there is hereby im-
posed an additional tax.
The net effect of these changes would be to accord special
use valuation to a property transferred out of the decedent's
M' 122 CONG. REc. S13,596 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Packwood).
1"0 I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(1).
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family provided that it is still used as a family farm. The recap-
ture provisions would be invoked if the farm were put to a non-
qualified use and not operated as a family farm.' 1 These
changes would also obviate some of the questions raised con-
cerning property in which not all the interests of ownership are
passed to the same person. For example, under the present
narrow view it is unclear whether special use valuation is avail-
able for a farm that is devised to a life tenant who is not a
qualified heir and to a remainder person who is a qualified
heir.'52 Under the broader view, if both the life tenant and the
remainder person put the farm to a qualified use, then special
use valuation may clearly be afforded.
IV. ESTATE PLANNING FOR MATERIAL PARTICIPATION
It is not for the courts or the treasury department to
broaden the applicability of section 2032A; that matter rests in
the hands of Congress. Whether or not Congress finds it expedi-
ent or wise to encourage transfer of the family farm from one
family to another, the material participation component must
be a concern to estate planners.'53
The surest method of meeting the material participation
requirement, and yet totally withdrawing from active farm-
ing,'54 is to turn the operation over to a member of the family.
It should be remembered that the decedent himself need not
materially participate.'55 The member of the family who as-
sumes control must then materially participate.' 6 Probably the
best course is to put the farm under the control of that person
who is to be the qualified heir.
15, See I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(2). See also I.R.C. § 2034A(e)(5).
152 See, e.g. COLSON & KAHN Supplement, supra note 7, at 106-07 and 121-24.
'5 The executor should consider the effect of special use valuation on basis. See
text accompanying notes 65-72 supra. For a suggestion regarding the use of buy-sell
agreements to control the valuation of farm property for estate tax purposes, see
Castleton, The Use of Restrictive Agreements in Estate Tax Valuation of Farmlands
and Other Properties, 64 KY. L.J. 785 (1976).
"51 Of those farm operators in Kentucky with annual sales of $2500 and over, 20
percent are 65 years old and older. 1974 CENSUS OF AGRIcuLTuRe, supra note 9, Table
28, at 1-9.
I' 122 CONG. Rc. S13,603 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Packwood);
I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1). See also example 3 in 43 Fed. Reg. 31,041 (1978) (Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 20.2032A-3(f)).
I" I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(C).
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If the qualified heir or other member of the family is not
in a position to assume control of the family farming operation
at the time the farmer wishes to reduce active participation,
the farmer may, by leasing the farm, at least minimize his
involvement to the point of semi-retirement and still meet the
material participation test. The lease agreement'57 should be
written and should clearly contemplate that the lessor is to
materially participate. '58 The lease should require that the les-
see seek the advice of the lessor; indeed it should be clear that
decision-making power resides in the lessor. Rent should be in
the form of a crop-share and not a flat money rent; the lessor
must assume a risk akin to that assumed when he operated the
farm himself. It must not appear that the lessee is the agent of
the lessor; therefore, the lease should require at least enough
physical labor from the lessor so as to meet the requirements
of Test Three.159 In addition, the lessor should finance some of
the costs of production as evidence that he bears a share of the
risk. Given the purpose of section 2032A, it may be that the
courts will use the "similar to" language to preclude participa-
tion of the Vance type:' financial underwriting with very min-
imal active participation, which is close to an agency arrange-
ment. The lease might provide that the lessor be active on a
full-time basis for two months during the spring. During this
period the lessor should take an active role in decision-making
257 See the Appendix infra for sample lease agreements.
'I This is both to comply strictly with the Treasury Regulations and to avoid the
risk that actual services rendered will be characterized as volunteered. Foster v. Cele-
brezze, 313 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1963); Trees. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b), T.D. 6691, 1963-2
C.B. 347.
"I See text accompanying note 88 supra for the provisions of Test Three.
Example 3 in the proposed regulations speaks directly to this situation-the
farmer who wishes to semi-retire. The example does not hypothesize actual physical
labor on the part of the retired farmer but it does envision regular consultation and
decision-making during both planting and harvesting. Furthermore, it does hypothe-
size that the semi-retired farmer will live in his old farm house when attending to
farming operations. 43 Fed. Reg. 31,041-42 (1978) (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-
3(f)). While cases decided under I.R.C. § 1402(a) have not directly focused upon resi-
dence on the farm as a factor in material participation, the proposed regulations do.
43 Fed. Reg. 31,041 (1978) (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(d)(2)). However, it
should be noted that residence is only one factor and is not solely determinative.
11 Vance v. Ribicoff, 202 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Tenn. 1961). However, the proposed
regulations seem to borrow the Vance facts for use in their second example, an example
exemplifying material participation. 43 Fed. Reg. 31,041-42 (1978) (Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 20.2032A-3(f)).
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and the initial work of crop production. Thereafter, the lessor
might relax into semi-retirement offering only periodic advice
and consultation.
If the option afforded by section 2032A is to be left open
to his executor, the family farmer must preserve carefully a
record of material participation. This is especially true for the
family farmer who wishes to reduce his active role in his later
years. Copies of correspondence, records of phone calls, and
notes of inspection tours and consultations should be filed for
future reference. The farmer should keep a log of the hours
worked and the tasks done. The work must focus on production
and not maintenance of capital. Accurate ledger entries should
be made of expenditures related to production. Records of ma-
terials and machinery furnished for use by the lessee and the
use to which they are put should be kept. The planner must
remember that the material participation test represents a
minimum standard of activity and it is best to plan and record
participation which exceeds the minimum.
David A. Bratt
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APPENDIX
Two farm lease agreements, taken from reported cases, are
presented here for illustrative purposes.
A. The Vance Lease '
CONTRACT-RENTAL OF FARM
This contracted [sic] entered into for the year 1958 be-
tween Mrs. Lizzie Vance of the first part and Lester Akins of
Second Part:
Akins is to cultivate this farm by raising the following
crops Namely: Hay Oats corn and Tobacco. For the year 1959
14 acres of wheat, 10 acres of Oats, 14 Hay and .06 Tobacco.
Party of the second part funishes tools for preparing and
cultivating the crop except the tobacco. Party of the First
Part funishes stock to tend the tobacco. Akins gets 2/3 of
Wheat, 1/2 Hay and 2/3 Corn.
Party of the First part furnishes 1/2 all '62 Fertilizer for the
Tobacco all of Spray and plants, sticks and barn room, par-
ticipates in raising tobacco as much as possible and the
agreement is that she advises where to Plant certain crops
and where to Market the grain and Tobacco.
Sign: /s/Mrs. Lizzie Vance
Mrs. Lizzie Vance, First Part
Sign: /s/Lester Akins
Lester Akins, Second Part
The court held that the agreement between Vance and
Akins contemplated Vance's material participation. The con-
tract represents the bare minimum. Still, the essentials are
there: She was to play a financial role and thereby undertake
a risk; she was to advise and consult and thereby manage pro-
duction; and she was to take an active physical part in the
production of the crop. The court further held that she actually
materially participated by carrying out the terms of the agree-
ment, and thus she was entitled to OASI benefits. Her physical
role, as suggested by the "as much as possible" language, was
in fact rather limited. Vance was eighty-two years old. Two or
is' Id.
,12 The court noted that the word "all" had been interlined by hand. Vance testi-
fied that it should have been "all," not "V2." Id. at 792.
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three times each week she passed through the tobacco crop
which was on the farm where she lived and she advised Akins
if the crop needed attention.'
B. The Foster Lease'"
In consideration of the leasing of the premises the Ten-
ants agree, without expense to the Landlord, to furnish all
necessary tools, machinery, equipment, livestock, crop seeds
(including hybrid seed corn), and labor to operate and main-
tain the farm in a husbandlike manner and to put in such
crops in such manner as the Landlord may direct and to pay
a cash rent and crop share rent as follows:
Two-fifths share of all small grain grown on said prem-
ises during term hereof;
One-half share of all corn grown on said premises during
term hereof;
Two-fifths share of all beans grown on said premises dur-
ing term hereof;
Cash rent of $6.50 per acre for all land not included in
foregoing crop, which cash rent shall be due and payable at
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, at threshing time but in no event later
than December 1 of the year of said term. In computing the
cash rental the farm shall be taken as 112.65 acres and from
this shall be deducted the acreage in corn, small grain, and
beans, and the cash rental above specified shall be paid on
the remainder.
If any installment of rent is not paid when due, the full
amount of the rental specified becomes due and payable at
once at the option of the Landlord.
The Tenants further agree:
1. To clean and treat all small grain seed and inoculate
all clover, alfalfa and soybean seed sown.
2. To plant only seeds, including hybrid seed corn, ap-
proved by the Landlord.
3. To clip all fields newly sown to clover and mow
weeds in pasture when and if requested by the Landlord.
4. To permit no hogs on grassland without ring in snout
and to reseed any ground rooted up.
5. To mow or spray the weeds along all fence rows each
m Id. The lease was executed two years after the 1958 crop year.
IU Foster v. Flemming, 190 F. Supp. 908 (M.D. Iowa 1960), rev'd sub non. Foster
v. Celebrezze, 313 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1963).
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year and to cut or control weeds in cultivated crops.
6. To keep the buildings and lots free and clean of trash
and litter, to keep the house lawn mowed and the lots free of
weeds, so as to present a neat appearance at all times.
7. To cut no alfalfa after September first nor cut a sec-
ond crop of clover at any time.
8. To furnish the Landlord immediately after har-est-
ing of all small grain and soybeans, a signed statement by the
'thresher showing the number of bushels or kind of grain or
seed threshed or combined.
9. To not burn, sell or remove any straw either bailed
or loose from the premises for it is agreed all unused straw is
the property of the Landlord.
10. To haul out and spread on the arable lands or wher-
ever Landlord may direct, all manure now on or hereafter
accumulated on the premises.
11. To plow no new seeding, meadow or permanent pas-
ture without the Landlord's written consent.
12. To pasture no meadows, cultivated fields or fields
sown to legumes without the Landlord's written consent.
13. To comply fully with the regulations of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture if so directed by the Landlord and to
operate the farm in compliance therewith.
14. To commit no waste or damage on the premises and
to permit none to be done.
15. To cut no live trees without written consent of the
Landlord.
16. To preserve and protect the fruit and ornamental
trees, vines and shrubbery, that are now or may be hereafter
planted upon the premises, from injury by plowing, or from
cattle or other stock or rabbits.
17. To protect and care for all buildings and improve-
ments and to keep the same in such state of repair as they
now are or may be placed during the term hereof, reasonable
wear or damage by accidental fire or windstorm only ex-
cepted.
18. To use the premises for agricultural purposes only
and to occupy the dwelling house and retain possession of
said premises during the entire term of this lease and not to
sublet any part thereof without the written consent of the
Landlord.
19. To furnish the labor for keeping the fences in condi-
tion without charge to the Landlord.
20. To husk and crib the Landlord's share of corn.
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21. To shovel corn into sheller and deliver the Land-
lord's share of crops to the nearest railroad market point or
any other equal distance when so directed by the Landlord.
(Landlord to pay for shelling).
22. To reserve for the Landlord a proportionate share of
cribs, bins or storage space available for the Landlord's share
of all crops.
23. To allow the Landlord, his agents or managers, or
whomever the managers may engage, the right to enter the
premises at any reasonable time to view the same or show
them to prospective purchasers or to make repairs or im-
provements or to plow land on which a crop has been re-
moved.
24. To surrender the premises at the termination of
their tenancy (including termination by cancellation) with-
out further demand or notice in such condition as shall be in
compliance with the provisions hereof.
In addition, Foster was to provide "all grass, clover and alfalfa
seed to be sown on the premises." ' 5
Foster had an agency relationship with a farm manage-
ment company which actually oversaw her interest in the lease
arrangement. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
had maintained that she could not materially participate
through an agent, 66 but while the appeal was pending the Sec-
retary acquiesced to vicarious participation. Thus, the only
real issue before the court of appeals was whether the arrange-
ment contemplated material participation."'
The district court had found that the provisions of the
lease which gave Foster a role in farm affairs, particularly
the consideration clause, were directed toward preserving her
capital investment in the farm and not toward production of
crops. ' 8 Almost one-half of the lease provisions were directed
toward preserving the farm, especially paragraphs numbered
four, six, fourteen through nineteen, and twenty-four. The dis-
trict court viewed the consideration clause with its broad grant
to control the farm in a "husbandlike manner" together with
the above mentioned paragraphs as a reflection of a basic pur-
"' Id. at 928-30.
'" Foster v. Celebrezze, 313 F.2d 604, 605 (8th Cir. 1963).
" Id. at 605, 609.
"A Foster v. Flemming, 190 F. Supp. at 908.
1977-78]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
pose to preserve the farm and held that such preservation did
not qualify as material participation.' 61 The court of appeals
seemed to disagree with this interpretation of those provisions
but rather than have its decision turn on "this rather close
question of interpretation, '"170 the court found that the addi-
tional numerical paragraphs clearly gave Foster a direct hand
in crop production. It should be noted that the lease did not
contemplate actual physical labor on the part of the lessor. Her
active role, actually her agent's role,"' was limited to inspec-
tion, consultation, and decision-making. Her financial role was
limited to providing the land and buildings. The court of ap-
peals held that the lease contemplated material participation.
And, because the Secretary had relented so as to allow actual
material participation through an agent, Foster's income quali-
fied for OASI purposes.17 2
The lesson for estate planners is clear. It is possible and
wise to include lease provisions directed toward preservation of
one's capital investment in the farm, but control over produc-
tion and managerial activities should be unmistakable, if not
actually predominant.
1"9 Id. at 930.
,T' Foster v. Celebrezze, 313 F.2d at 608.
' See note 84 supra for a discussion of participation through an agent.
,7 Foster v. Celebrezze, 313 F.2d at 608.
[Vol. 66
